We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals o¤er simple menus (i.e.
1 could have o¤ered in the original game that sustains the same outcomes. This result is referred to in the literature as the Delegation Principle (or the Menu Theorem) and has proved useful in applications.
Recent years have witnessed interest in environments in which contracting is sequential, in the sense that the agent contracts with his multiple principals at di¤erent points in time. 1 In light of this fast growing literature, it is important to understand whether restricting the principals to o¤er menus of payo¤-relevant alternatives, as opposed to more general mechanisms, is without loss of generality also when contracting is sequential.
In this note we construct two examples that illustrate why simple menus may fail to sustain all equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments.
The …rst example features a situation in which the principals observe the payo¤-relevant decisions taken upstream, but not necessarily the mechanisms used to select them. In this setting, restricting the principals to o¤er menus may mean restricting the extent to which di¤erent principals can have diverging beliefs about the speci…c mechanism used upstream to select an o¤-equilibrium decision. When the agent's strategy is not Markov (i.e. it may depend on the entire upstream history), this means imposing restrictions on the principals'expectations about the agent's behavior downstream. Such restrictions may preclude the possibility of sustaining certain outcomes.
The second example features a situation in which all principals observe both the mechanisms and the payo¤-relevant decisions selected upstream. The reason why simple menus fail in this example is that they do not permit the principals to use payo¤-irrelevant information as a device to correlate their decisions. In the absence of alternative instruments such as sunspots or cheap talk messages, this means restricting the possible outcomes.
These examples warn against the use of simple menus in certain sequential contracting environments. However, there are situations of interest for applications in which the problems indicated by these examples never arise. Furthermore, there are ways of enriching the menus (for example allowing the principals to send each other, and/or the agent, recommendations about the decisions to take downstream) that may restore the possibility of using menus to sustain all equilibrium outcomes. We discuss some of these issues at the end of the note. 1 We refer the reader to Pavan and Calzolari (2007) for a discussion of the relevance of sequential contracting in applications. 2 
Simple menus
This section contains two examples that illustrate why simple menus may not sustain all equilibrium outcomes when contracting is sequential.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs
Consider a game in which four principals contract sequentially with the same agent, A. The game has four stages. At each stage, a di¤erent principal, P i ; i = 1; :::; 4; contracts with A: Each principal must select a payo¤-relevant alternative a i (also referred to as a decision) from a set A i of feasible alternatives. Depending on the application of interest, a i can be a policy, a level of trade, or the decision to undertake a project.
The selection of a i is obtained through a mechanism; the latter consists of a set of possible messages M i along with a mapping i : M i ! A i such that, when A sends the message m i 2 M i , P i responds by selecting the alternative a i 2 A i :
In this example, the sets of feasible alternatives are A i = fb i ; c i g; for i = 1; :::; 3; and A 4 = fd; e; f g: The principals'and the agent's payo¤s are described by the quintuples (u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 ; u 4 ; u A ) in Figure 1 ; note that, when all players'payo¤s are independent of the decisions taken after period t = 1; :::; 3; the tree has been cut to highlight directly the …nal payo¤s.
Before choosing her mechanism, each downstream principal observes all the payo¤-relevant decisions taken upstream. Furthermore each downstream principal observes all upstream mechanisms, with the exception of the mechanism selected by P 1 : None of the principals observes the messages sent by the agent to the other principals. Now consider the game in which the sets of feasible mechanisms are 1 = f
g for P 2 and P 3 , and 4 = f 2 ; regardless of (a 1 ; a 2 ; 2 ); P 3 o¤ers : Clearly, this is only a partial description of the strategy pro…le; however, such a description contains all information that is relevant for the result we want to establish.
The aforementioned strategy pro…le is sustained by the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: after observing c 1 , P 2 believes that 1 = 
:
We claim that the outcome (b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; d) cannot be sustained in the "menu game" M in which the principals are restricted to o¤er the menus of payo¤-relevant alternatives they could have o¤ered in and delegate to the agent the choice of the decisions. We prove the result by showing that this outcome requires that, after observing a deviation to c 1 ; the supports of P 2 's, P 3 's, and P 4 's beliefs about the mechanism used by P 1 not overlap, which clearly cannot be the case in M .
To see this, note that P 1 (weakly) prefers b 1 to c 1 if and only if c 1 is followed by b 2 and b 3 :
Hence, for (b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; d) to be an equilibrium outcome in M ; it must be that, after observing a deviation to c 1 ; P 2 and P 3 o¤er menus that contain, respectively, b 2 and b 3 , and that A selects b 2 and b 3 in each of these menus. Furthermore, because A strictly prefers c 2 to b 2 after c 1 and strictly prefers c 3 to b 3 after (c 1 ; b 2 ); it must be that P 2 o¤ers the (degenerate) menu fb 2 g after observing c 1 and that P 3 o¤ers the (degenerate) menu fb 3 g after observing the menu fb 2 g and the decisions (c 1 ; b 2 ): Because P 2 can always guarantee herself a payo¤ of 2 by choosing c 2 after c 1 ; for her to o¤er the menu fb 2 g it must be that she expects A to choose b 3 with P 3 and f with P 4 : Similarly, because P 3 can always guarantee herself a payo¤ of 2 by choosing c 3 after (c 1 ; b 2 ), for her to o¤er the menu fb 3 g it must be that she expects A to choose d with P 4 : Lastly, because P 4 can always guarantee herself a payo¤ of 2 by choosing e after (c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ); for her to o¤er any other menu, it must be that this menu contains e and that she expects A to choose e from the menu.
We conclude that any strategy pro…le that sustains (b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; d) as an equilibrium in M must satisfy the following properties: P 2 o¤ers the menu fb 2 g after observing c 1 ; P 3 o¤ers the menu fb 3 g after observing the menu fb 2 g and the decisions (c 1 ; b 2 ); P 4 o¤ers the menu fe; f; gg after observing the menus fb 2 g and fb 3 g and the decisions (c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ). Now, given the decisions (c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ) and the upstream menus fb 2 g and fb 3 g; the agent's behavior at t = 4 may vary only on the basis of the particular menu containing c 1 o¤ered at t = 1. Because in M there are only two such menus, there are only two possible behavioral strategies that A can follow at t = 4 given the decisions (c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ) and the menus fb 2 g and fb 3 g. It is thus impossible that P 2 , P 3 and P 4 expect A to choose respectively f; d; and e with probability one when o¤ered the menu fe; f; gg: The outcome (b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; d) can thus be sustained in but not in the "menu game" M .
Correlation devices
We now illustrate a second reason why menus may not sustain all possible outcomes. Consider an environment in which three principals contract sequentially with the same agent. The sets of feasible alternatives are A 1 = ftg and A 2 = A 3 = [0; 1]: For simplicity, assume P 1 's and P 3 's payo¤s are constant over A A 1 A 2 A 3 , whereas P 2 's and A's payo¤s are respectively u 2 = 2a 2 a 3 + (1 a 2 )(1 a 3 ) and u A = a 3 (1 + a 2 ). In this environment, all principals observe all mechanisms selected upstream. Whether they also observe the payo¤-relevant decisions taken in these mechanisms is not important in this example but, to …x ideas, assume they do. i is a mechanism such that Im(
The following is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in : P 1 randomizes over 1 and 1 with probability q 2 (0; 1) and 1 q, respectively; given 1 , P 2 chooses a 2 = 1; whereas given 1 she chooses a 2 = 0; at t = 3; regardless of ( 2 ; a 2 ) ; P 3 chooses a 3 = 1 if 1 = 1 and a 3 = 0 if 1 = 1 .
The equilibrium outcome is (t; 1; 1) with probability q and (t; 0; 0) with probability 1 q: This outcome cannot be sustained in the "menu game" M in which the principals o¤er the menus of payo¤-relevant alternatives they could have o¤ered in and delegate to the agent the choice of the decisions. The reason is that M does not permit P 1 to correlate the other principals' decisions.
The role of P 1 as a correlation device is key to sustain the outcome described above and cannot be replicated by P 2 . In fact, P 2 …nds it optimal to match the decision taken by P 3 -and hence to respond to the mechanism selected by P 1 anticipating how P 3 responds to it-but is never willing to mix over A 2 , for she strictly prefers (a 2 ; a 3 ) = (1; 1) to (a 2 ; a 3 ) = (0; 0):
Discussion
The equilibrium constructed in the …rst example is a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium but neither a sequential nor a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Imposing such re…nements may restore the possibility of using menus to sustain all outcomes. In this respect, the example highlights an important di¤erence between simultaneous and sequential common agency. In the former, the validity of the Delegation Principle is independent of whether one is interested in all perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes or only in outcomes that can be sustained by imposing re…nements such as sequential or Markov-perfect equilibrium. This is not the case in the latter.
Next, consider the second example. If public sunspots are available, then restricting the principals to o¤er simple menus may not pose any problem. The role of the example is to warn against the use of simple menus in environments in which alternative correlation devices are not available-another important di¤erence with respect to the simultaneous case.
Also note that the notion of menus considered here is the one used in applications: a menu is a collection of payo¤-relevant alternatives. 2 The problems highlighted by our examples vanish if one considers more general menus that allow the principals to send each other, and/or the agent, recommendations about the decisions to take downstream. For instance, in the …rst example, the two mechanisms 1 = fc 1 g and 1 = fc 1 g can be replaced by two menus that contain the same payo¤-relevant decision but two di¤erent recommendations to the agent about the strategy to follow downstream. Provided that these recommendations are private (in the sense that they are not observed by the downstream principals), then the outcome (b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ; d) can be sustained also in the menu game with recommendations. 3 Similarly, the outcome in the second example can be sustained by letting the …rst principal send public (perfectly correlated) recommendations to the downstream principals.
These enriched menus are more similar to Myerson (1982) generalized direct revelation mechanisms than to simple menus such as price-quantity schedules, as typically used in applications.
As shown in Peters (2001) , allowing for such enriched menus may be necessary when the agent exerts some e¤ort after communicating with the principals. In Peters' environment, contracting is simultaneous and recommendations are used to fashion the agent's beliefs about the principal's response to the agent's e¤ort. Because this is the only role that recommendations play in simultaneous games, such recommendations can be dispensed with if one allows the principals to o¤er menus of lotteries over contracts (as opposed to menus of deterministic decisions). 4 The role of recommendations in sequential contracting is di¤erent: in the …rst example, recommendations are used to permit the downstream principals to have diverging beliefs about the agent's behavior in downstream relationships. In the second example, recommendations are used to correlate the principals'decisions. Furthermore, it may not su¢ ce to introduce lotteries to dispense with such recommendations, as it can be seen by considering the second example where there is a single such lottery.
While our examples warn against the use of simple menus in certain environments, there are situations in which simple menus do sustain all equilibrium outcomes. As shown in Pavan and Calzolari (2007) , this is always the case when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals observe neither the mechanisms nor the payo¤-relevant decisions selected upstream. Furthermore, even when contracting is not private, all equilibrium outcomes sustained by Markov strategies can be sustained with simple menus. Because Markov strategies are often considered a focal class, 3 We thank a referee for suggesting this possibility. 4 In a moral hazard setting, a decision should be interpreted as a contract that speci…es the principal's action as a function of some veri…able performance measure correlated with the agent's e¤ort.
